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only to do sweaty work in distinguishing particular matched decisions but also
to find underlying harmonies and discordances in general doctrine. The editors'
basic approach calls for the use of many old cases; these are not inserted for
their antiquarian interest, but serve rather to demonstrate that the rational
study of doctrine often depends on the use of an historical method. I would
have wanted the editors' questions to force the student more often to parse
words in agreements and to advise definite steps in tangled fact situations that
respect no boundaries, not even those set up in these chapters. But something,
after all, must be left to the initiative and taste of the individual teacher.
Professors Kessler and Sharp have produced a first-rate book. Its flaws, as
I see them, are minor and more than offset by its cogent pattern and its wealth
of imaginative suggestion.
BENJAMIN KAPLANt
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE U.S.S.R. By John N. Hazard. Toronto:
The Carswell Company, 1953. Pp. x, 310. $4.50.
MANY people consider Soviet law a mere facade which scarcely conceals
the operative realities of political dictatorship and terror. This view finds
support in the writings of those scholars who have focused attention upon
Communist Party control of legal doctrine, upon the lack of independence of
the Soviet judiciary, upon the powes of the security police, upon the use of
judicial trials for propaganda purposes, and so forth.
Professor Hazard's book-the fruit of his nearly two decades of experience
with Soviet law-takes a quite different view. He treats Soviet law as an
independent source of power for the Soviet leadership, an important technique
of political and social engineering which is relatively isolated from other
techniques such as police pressure and propaganda. He gives primary atten-
tion to property, contracts, criminal law, cooperatives (including collective farm
law), labor law, patent and copyright law, social insurance, family law, and inter-
national law. Although he devotes a chapter to the one-party system and to
the restrictions upon civil liberties, and a page or two to the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, he presents these subjects as more or less peripheral. He
does not discuss the removability of judges and their subjection to Party
pressures; the famous "purge trials" of 1936 to 1938 are mentioned only once,
in connection with the elimination of factions within the Communist Party.
These omissions are not due to any lack of awareness by the author of the
importance of non-legal and illegal controls in Soviet society, but rather to
his conviction that Soviet law has a reality of its own. This reality he demon-
strates most effectively through the use of cases decided by the Soviet courts.
The book is built almost entirely around such cases, of which there are over
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150 digested or referred to. It is, of course, impossible to tell from official
Soviet case reports the extent to which disputes in the Soviet Union are re-
solved non-judicially by administrative, Party, or police decision. However,
the reports do show that a very wide variety, of problems come before the
Soviet courts.
The author explains the judicial decisions, and the legislation which they
interpret, as means whereby the Soviet leaders "have sought to solidify their
power position and to lay the base for a new pattern of social organization.""
The approach to Soviet law as an instrument of political and social control,
and the implicit definition of Soviet law as the will of the leadership expressed
in statutes and judicial decisions, will undoubtedly appeal to many readers.
Even among those who would reject such a jurisprudence if applied to other
countries, the opinion is widely shared that in the Soviet Union, certainly,
to quote Lenin, "law is politics." In stressing power considerations, Professor
Hazard has also brought the study of Soviet law into line with a current
approach to Soviet institutions generally-though few who adopt this approach
have attached as much importance to law in the Soviet "power process"
as he does.
It is with some diffidence, therefore, and with the greatest respect for Pro-
fessor Hazard's large storehouse of knowledge of Soviet legal materials, that
this reviewer questions the validity of his basic analysis.
I
ly first difficulty is with the ambiguities in the concept "power"; they
limit severely its usefulness as a basis for analyzing a legal system. These
ambiguities may be partially resolved, first, by keeping distinct various gen-
eral categories of power, such as long-range and short-range power, real
and formal power, economic and political power (though there remains the
question of whether the word power has not shifted its meaning in the course
of such analysis) ; and, second, by distinguishing, still further, various specific
forms of power, such as the "power" to plan the production and distribution of
goods, the power to get the plans executed, the power to suppress opposition,
the power to prevent labor turnover, the power to promote efficiency in agri-
culture, the power to prevent theft and corruption, the power to promote
initiative in science and technology -and a thousand other kinds of power
which may all be added together to make up the general power concept.
When these distinctions are preserved, however, it becomes apparent that
there is often an inherent conflict between different kinds of power. Thus the
power position of the leadership is weakened by the industrial inefficiency
which results from high labor turnover; its power position is also weakened
by the industrial inefficiency which results from low worker morale caused
by freezing workers to their jobs. Similarly, the leadership's power position
1. P. 3. Cf. pp. x, 63, 276, and passim.
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is weakened if industrial managers are permitted to upset plans by making
their own decisions regarding production and distribution of goods; it is
also weakened if the plans are frustrated because managers must wait for
orders from Moscow before making any move. Again, the power of the
leaders is weakened-or they think it is-if scientists are free to advance
theories contrary to the Party line; but it is also weakened if central control
of science inhibits creative and original discoveries and inventions. Faced
with a multitude of such dilemmas, the Soviet leadership must continually
sacrifice some kinds of power for the sake of other kinds of power; to say
that the decisions it takes are means of enhancing its power does not explain
those decisions.
Professor Hazard supplements a power analysis with an analysis in terms
of molding a new society. He sometimes seems to identify the two analyses; in the
first paragraph of his book, for example, he indicates his desire to present
material "relating the Soviet system of law as an entirety to the power
process, to the avowed aim of moulding a new society." 2 In other places he
speaks of the two aspects-power and the remaking of society-as comple-
mentary rather than identical.3 However, it would seem obvious that at many
points there is a sharp conflict between these two goals of the Soviet leader-
ship. This conflict is explicitly suggested at only one point in Professor
Hazard's book, where he speaks of Soviet criminal law as "an instrument
with which the leadership may deal with its enemies." "In a sense," he states,
"it is no longer an element with which social change may be effected. It has
become an element to hold behind the barriers those who would prevent the
social change for which the foundations have been laid in property law and
in social organization."14 I doubt that this conflict in the functions of criminal
law-repressing enemies versus effecting social change-has been so sharply
resolved in favor of the former. Elsewhere in the volume Professor Hazard
has shown the use of criminal law to effect social change: to make officials
behave rationally, to make workers serve the factory rather than their own
interests, and so forth. In any case, other branches of Soviet law offer ample
evidence of the conflict between the leadership's desire to maintain its power
and its desire to remake society. The relative independence of the peasant
household on the collective farm r is a good example of compromise between
these two conflicting goals. Professor Hazard's belief that the cooperative
form is eventually doomed to be swallowed up by state centralization 0 -as
Soviet doctrine itself proclaims-assumes a docile peasantry which will work
faithfully without the incentives of the traditional household economy.
2. P. ix.
3. E.g.: "It is in this area [property law] that the Soviet leaders have sought to








Apart from the ambiguities inherent in the concept of power, the approach
to Soviet law as a means of maintaining political and social control by the
leadership seems to lead to a serious oversimplification of the legal problems
which confront the Soviet leadership. One of Professor Hazard's interesting
cases will illustrate my point. An excavating corporation had contracted with
a building corporation to excavate 16,000 cubic meters of earth at a certain
price per cubic meter; after twro months of work, without notifying the build-
er, "in the dead of night the excavating corporation moved its excavators from
the spot and stopped work."'7 The builder thereafter, without notifying the
excavator, hired manual labor to complete the excavation, and subsequently
sued for the difference between the cost of the manual labor and the contract
price. At trial before the Moscow State Arbitration Tribunal, evidence was
presented by both sides relating to the condition of the soil which might
justify the defendant, on the one hand, in stopping work, and the plaintiff, on
the other hand, in hiring manual labor to complete the work. Professor Hazard
reports the decision as follows:
"The tribunal's decision must have been a surprise to both
parties. The arbitrator declared that the excavating corporation
and the building corporation had both been at fault, and so seri-
ously at fault that their action was criminal. The prosecutor
was informed of the facts to determine whether prosecution
should follow. The arbitrator was incensed that the excavating
corporation had stopped work without notice to the other party,
and that the building corporation had remained passive and
spent 83,000 roubles of State funds on costly manual labour with-
out trying to make the excavating corporation return to the
job. No damages were awarded because the decision to employ
manual labour had been taken by the building corporation on its
own initiative and without trying to have the work completed
by the other party."s
"The facts suggest," Professor Hazard concludes, "that the managers of the
two corporations felt remarkably free to make their own decisions in matters
of great concern involving thousands of roubles of expense. W1hile they were
disciplined for their actions it may be presumed that they acted as they did
because the general temper of the community at the time permitted such
action."9
This interpretation (and similar interpretations of other cases) may make
sense in the context in which the author places it-the utilization of law to
maintain centralized control over the managers. But is that the context in
which the tribunal (and the Soviet leadership, if you will) made its decision?
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was not how to subject people to the control of the leadership, but rather how
to subject them to the control of each other. Two managers in a contract
relationship reacted in a primitive manner when their expectations were not
fulfilled. Their conduct reflects an irresponsible and perhaps irrational attitude
not toward the regime but toward each other, and, more specifically, toward
their legal relationship. This is a lack of legal sophistication which is chacter-
istically Russian. Managers must be taught to keep their contracts, and to
seek amendment of contracts when circumstances so require; in any case, they
must not withdraw their equipment "in the dead of night" and incur expenses
chargeable to the other party without notice to him. (The denial of a contract
remedy is not the surprising element in the case, and might well be what an
American court would decide in similar circumstances; the suggestion that
there should be criminal prosecution of both parties is what makes the case
interesting.) For the Soviet leadership this is not a problem of "power" ("re-
pression of enemies") or of "social change" except in the most general sense
(as one might say it is a problem of "life") ; it is primarily a problem of
instilling in managers a sense of legal reciprocity, of mutuality of rights and
duties, of enforcing, in the Soviet phrase, "contract discipline." Behind this
problem there lie the crucial difficulties of maintaining a rational system of
distribution of goods and services in a planned economy.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that in a general sense to the
Soviet leaders "law is politics," and that they use law to influence Soviet
citizens to behave in a manner beneficial to the regime. But, to paraphrase
Clausewitz' famous maxim about war, law is politics carried on by other
means. It is the means, and especially the procedures, which distinguish law
from other political activity, just as they distinguish the politics of peace from
the politics of war. The means chosen severely limit the range of available
alternatives. Thus even where the Soviet regime has utilized law most ruth-
lessly for enhancing its power, it has encountered problems arising from the
nature of law itself. For example, by a 1940 statute, criminal sanctions were
imposed upon workers for lateness or absence without adequate reason and
for quitting their jobs without managerial permission. Professor Hazard
reveals for the first time significant evidence that since 1952, at least, this
legislation has not been enforced, though there has been no publication of
its repeal.10 Although one can only speculate on the reasons for this develop-
ment, it seems clear that the 1940 law, in relying so heavily upon judicial
control of labor discipline, exceeded the limits of effective legal action. Labor
turnover continued despite the criminal sanctions, which were avoided or
evaded by one means or another. The problem goes beyond the question of
the Soviet leadership's severity or lack of severity in "moulding the disciplined
and devoted Soviet workman needed to accomplish its purposes."" The more
fundamental problem concerns the limitations which law itself imposes upon






Apart from defects of ambiguity and oversimplification, the study of Soviet
law as an instrument for maintaining the power of the leaders and accomplish-
ing their social and economic objectives seems to suffer from a third defect.
By treating Soviet law always as a means to other ends, it ignores the spe-ific
legal ends of Soviet law. The terms justice and injustice are conspicuous by
their absence from Professor Hazard's index and I believe from the pages of
the text as well. The Soviet literature does not hesitate to claim that Soviet
law is characterized by procedural fairness, equality before the law, objctivity
of decisions, stability of law, and other characteristics of justice. Indeed
Vyshinsky
, 
would qualify Professor Hazard's statement that to the Marmist
law is politics: he has said that Soviet law is more than politics, and has
condemned those Marxists who have attempted to reduce it to politics. It
seems to me that Professor Hazard could have done a great service by
evaluating these Soviet claims and by testing them against Soviet legal
realities.
It may be permissible to write a book on Soviet law which treats law as an
independent alternative to force in the Soviet system and which, except for one
brief reference,' does not seek to show relationships between the two. It
seems to me a questionable undertaking, however, to write a book about
Soviet law which does not treat explicitly the injustices in Soviet law itself
-e.g., the trial of certain crimes in the absence of the accused and without
right of counsel or right of appeal-and the extent to which these exceptional
provisions influence the whole system. Professor Hazard's neglect to discuss
the Soviet judicial system, the legal profession, and civil and criminal pro-
cedure, which incidentally makes it difficult for the reader fully to understand
the cases which he presents, is, I think, due to his acceptance of a frame-
work of analysis which places law entirely in the service of non-legal ends.
These ommissions may not seem important to the social scientist. However,
the lawyer's main contribution to social science must consist in the demon-
stration not merely that law is an important technique for achieving political,
economic or social results, but also that it is an independent source of strength
or weakness in society, and that "due process of law" is more than a means
to other ends-it is an end in itself.
It would be unfair to charge Professor Hazard with all the implications
of a legal philosophy which he has not explicitly adopted but has merely
used as a basis of analysis. Your reviewer trusts in any event that his critic-
ism has indicated that this is a challenging book containing much that is of
interest and of value.
Hxnow J. BERI AN t
12. Professor Hazard states that the Ministry of Internal Affairs "is designed to
cope primarily, but not entirely, with mass dissension and unrest exceeding the capabilities
of the criminal courts, which are necessarily limited in effectiveness in time of crisi'
because of their individualised approach and their relatively slow preceedings." P. S9.
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